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Baruch Spinoza was born at Amsterdam in
1632 of Portuguese Jewish parents.

In accordance

with the wishes of his father he was carefully ed
ucated by the Rabbis of his own people in Hebrew
theology and literature including of cuurse the
Talmud and the more modern commentaries of Maimonides and Ibn Ezra.

He was also sent to the

Latin school of Van den Ende, an Amsterdam physi
cian, where he received his first impulse to the
study of Descartes ' philosophy and his first les
sons in the principles of natural science.

After

he grew to manhood suspicions of his orthodoxy
were raised and after several attempts to induce
h i m to conform to the faith of the synogogue had
failed he was expelled f r o m the Jewish community
in 1656.

Henceforth he provided for himself a

slender bu£ sufficient income by grinding and
polishing lenses for optical instruments, while
devoting the remainder of his time to the devel
opment of his own philosophical ideas.

His love of independence led h im to

j
i

i

k

•
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t
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I

decline the Heidelberg professorship of philosophy

i
>.

I
\\

offered h i m by Karl Ludwig, the Elector Palatine.

i

He wrote his principal works at the Hague between

I

the years 1660 and 1667.

i

treatise entitled:

In 1663 he published the

"Renati Descartes principorum

philosophical Pars I et II more geometrico demonstratae, and in 1670 the anonymous work:

"Tractatus

Theologico - politicus", in which he discusses andgives rationalistic solutions of such problems as
inspiration, prophecy, miracles and free investi
gation.

His chief work, Ethica more Geometrica

Demonstrata and several other less important treat
ises were published after his death under the care
of his friend, Ludwig Meyer*

His "Tractus de Deo,

Homine, ejusque Felicitate" was unknown to the phil
osophical public until 1852.

Difficulties of Interpretation.
The philosophy of Spinoza would be a
difficult and subtle one to state even were it
completely formulated: as he left it, the articu
lation and dependence of its parts are not perfect.

i

i
■')

—

_
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Distinctions are frequently reiterated to become
clear cut only gradually;

sometimes it seems as
e
if definitions are modified in repetition.
Ex
tension and thought are defined only after repeat
ed explanations have been made clear, how these
attributes are to be distinguished from the t r a 
ditional ones and what correlation and contrast
there is to be between them.

Sometimes the diffi

culty seems to be one of expression, for though
the language is tersely exact and beautifully
accurate it bears the marks of painful revision.
Since there is so much misunderstanding it seems
probable that the work of revision may not have
been perfected or completed.

But possibly the

fault is not Spinoza rs and if what he means by
idea, seems to be labored to its final conception
through the whole length of Book II of the Ethics,
the confusions may not have come f r o m any vagueness
in his mind, but f r o m the variety of senses in
which we have been reading that word since his time.

In expression as well as ideas Spinoza
stands between two ages.

Within his lifetime

vJ
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I

even the language he used, had come to have differ-

£
|

ent meanings.

i

of the philosophers we have come to call modern,

|

but in a significant sense his intellectual fel-

|

lowship is with the mediaevals*

He is a contemporary .of the first

This place which

he occupies in the history of thought is another
source for much of the strange interpretation that
I

I

!

|

has been found for his doctrine and his terminology.

He was concerned largely with problems

which occupied the attention of his predecessors;
and except in rare instances, the statements he
cited with approval from the works of his contem
poraries pleased him for other reasons and b e 
cause of other implications than those which their
authors had mostly tried to. bring out#
Sometimes the difficulty and the confuI,

|

sion of Spinoza's writings are genuine problems

|

which yield no solution*

He was faced, to take

an example, with the problem of the relation of
;

finite bodies and God.

In the "Short Treatise",

i

which was his first work, it seemed a simple
problem and^he disposed of it thus:

"Now to prove

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

]
i
a
|

that there is a body in Nature, can be no difficult
taabt for us.

1

of God and of his attributes”.

The proof requires only a knowledge
Fifteen years later

■S

] a correspondent, Tschernhaus, raises that problem
I in almost the same terms: "In the first place I
I
I can conceive only with difficulty how the exis-

|

tence of bodies which have motion and figure can
I
i

be demonstrated a priore; since nothing of the
sort occurs in extension considering the thing
absolutely.” (Ep.80) To which Spinoza replies:
"If extension be conceived as Decartes conceived

!

it, that is, as a quiescent mass, it is not only
difficult but impossible to demonstrate the exis
tence of things.” (Ep.81)

Tschernhaus recognizes

and expands on the difficulties in the case of
Descartes, but asks Spinoza to indicate

”how the

variety of things can be shown a priori from the
concept of extension according to your
tions."

(Ep. 82)

medita

He answers that the variety of

things cannot be demonstrated from the concept
of extension, but that it must necessarily be
explained through an attribute which expresses
eternal and infinite essence.

This position

I
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8

.

I
a
I
1 and statement were those which in the "Short
I
I Treatis^ seemed to him the solution of the problem.
I
C
I "But," he adds now, "I shall treat of these things
1 with you more clearly some d a y if life be suffi
cient.

For up to the present I have been able to

put nothing concerning these matters in order."
(Ep. 83)

Apparently his life was not sufficiently

long enough to remove the difficulties.

But it

had been long enough to indicate that the confi
dent statement of the Short Treatise was the
statement and not the solution of the problem;
bodies are related to the attribute of extension;
but the mechanism to mediate between bodies and
j extension was never set in order.

There are

other such definite outlines in the Ethics which
were never to be filled in.

|

Consequently there are enough elements

j of confusion gathered about the works of Spinoza.
t
; But it does not seem too much to hope that the
:
■ coherent, logical f o r m which he strove so defini

! itely and consistently to confer upon his philos; ophy, can be recovered in at least the detail

i
i

that he gave it.

Restatement of that unity is

J
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needed, particularly since it can be made with an
emphasis determined b y criticism to which he
could not have anticipated.

"From the method

Spinoza employed and f r o m the confidence he
had in the efficacy of deductive or synthetic
reasoning, one is led to expect that the answer
will be a consistent and autonomous doctrine.
It may be incomplete in some details, for the
unity is a formal one, and concerned therefore,
not with the specific inclusion of everything
that is known, but rather with the conceivable
si

manner in which anything that may be known is to
be included.

To say this is only to insist on

Spinoza's f irm conviction that the search for
truths could be conducted with profit only after
one had investigated what is implied in the fact
that we can conceive a truth or can desire that
which we conceive to be good.

Then one may

j]

speak of the power of the intellect and the strength

!

of the emotions.

]
I

out forcefully what is involved in his philosophy

Such an insistence will bring

■3

and will recognize, too, as a proper consequence

:ij

!

of this philosophy that in the age which was to
go into madness of observation and experimentation
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8.

he could appraise Bacon's little stories and
insist that Boyle 's experiments revealed and
could reveal nothing which was not already known
about that nature of things.”

jyicKeon, Philosophy

of Spino za, p. 188.
Method
In developing his doctrines,

Spinoza

is not content with pure deductive reasoning
but presents them in geometrical manner.

Prom

a certain number of definitions he deduces a
system whose parts are logically connected with
each other.

This method of Exposition is not

an arbitrary form or a provisional framework;
it is of a piece with the system and constitutes
Its permanent skeleton.

When Spinoza treats of

the 'world, of man and his passions as Euclid in
his Elements treats of lines, planes and angles,
it Is because, in principle and in fact, he sets
as great value upon these objects of philosophy
as the geometer upon his.

And just as the con

clusions of geometry invariably follow from their
axioms,

so the moral and physical facts 'which the

philosopher considers, follow with absolute nee-

permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

9.

?

sssity from the nature of things, expressed b y

|

their definitions.

5

final causes than the geometer asks to what end

He no more inquires into their

[j

(

the three angles of a given triangle are equal

!

to two right angles.

I
|
p
ji
I

•

It is not his method that

leads him to mathematical determinism;

on the

contrary, he employs it because f r o m the very
outset he views the world fr o m the geometrical,

!j

jj
p

‘ that is, the deterministic standpoint.
with Pythagoras,

He agrees

Plato and Descartes that philos-

fj

I
j

ophy is the generalization of mathematics.

How-

j

ever, to the writer of this thesis, this georaet-

j

rical f o r m adds little to Spinoza's work, and in

I

many respects it is a real drawback, for it gives
to his profound insights an appearance of artifi-

[

|

ciality which tends to obscure their real meaning.
But Spinoza believed that mathematics furnished

!

the universal

type of true science, and he assumed

that the absolute certainty which was then r e 
garded as essential to science, could only be
attained by following the same method.

What is

most valuable in his system is not the result of
his formal deductions, but the fruit of his gen
ius as shown through his wonderful speculative

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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I.

i
:
|

intuition and keen psychological analysis*

i
i
i

{

Man's Place In Nature

>

t
j
I
?

Notwithstanding its severe scientific
form Spinoza 's philosophy is based on ethical

li

?

I

motives, and has a decidedly practical character.
What he sought throughout his life of lonely nudilation was not knowledge as the mere satisfaction
of intellectual curiosity, but rather knowledge
of m a n ’s place in the universe.

In the ’’Improve

ment of the Understanding” we find an autobiograph
ical account of S p i n o z a ’s decision to choose the
lightest end of life.

After explaining the u n 

satisfactory nature of a life devoted to pleasure
or honor or riches, and the evils and disturban
ces to which such a life is subject, he says:
"All of these arise f r o m the love of what is
perishable,

such as the objects already mentioned.

But love toward a thing eternal and infinite feeds
the mind wholly with joy and is itself unmingled
with any sadness.

Wherefore it is greatly to be

desired and sought for with all our strength.”
(Opera Posthuma, p. 135.)

Moreover ’’whatsoever

in the sciences does not serve to promote our

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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11.

object will have to be rejected as u s e l e s s . " (idem
p. 185)

Nevertheless there is for Spinoza no op

position between theory and practice; for the
knowledge of the systematic unity of all things,
and of God as their source and essence, is itself
the supreme good and blessedness for man.

The

highest good is realized only in and through the
most complete knowledge.
Prom this conception springs his ethical
doctrine, developed in the third, fourth and fifth
parts of the Ethics.

In its practical form his

teaching assumes that everything,
lies,

so far as in it

strives to remain in its own being.

The

effort by which this striving is manifest is nothing
but the actual essence of the thing.

This effort

when it is in the mind alone is will; when in mind
and body, it is appetite.

If desire is satisfied

we have; pleasure, if not, we have sorrow.

All

affections and emotions resolve themselves into
desire, joy and sorrow, accompanied by ideas.
A

thing is not desired because it is good; it is

good because It is desired.

Knowledge of good and

bad can be a cause In the moral world, counteract
ing passion, and raising us fr o m the world of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

12
|
i

I
|
j
j

appetite and mortality to the world of eternal
truths.

Hence, it is with the problem of m a n ’s

place in nature - his relation to God or the total
system of things, and the possibility of his freel
|

dom depends upon his first recognizing that man is

j

a part of nature, and that his mind, like every-

I
I
|

thing else, is subject to uniform natural laws.
Man forms no kingdom within a kingdom.

It is not

I

contingency or some strange power of free will

|

which governs his mental experiences; but here
as elsewhere all takes place according to law and

I
i

necessity.

"Nature’s laws and ordinances whereby

all things come to pass and change from one form
to another are everywhere and always the same.
There should, therefore, be one and the same
method of

understanding the nature of all things

whatsoever, viz., through n a t u r e ’s universal lav/s
and r u l e s

I shall consider human actions and

desires in exactly the same manner as though I
were concerned with lines, planes and solids."
(Eth.I - 16)

From this standpoint he gives a

scientific account of the origin and nature of
emotions, showing how they necessarily arise from
|

certain assignable causes and how their intensity
depends on definite natural conditions.

The var-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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|
f
|

primary states: pleasure, pain and desire*

|

this reduction of the emotions to law is only a

|

ious emotions are all found.to be compounds of the

preliminary step in S p i n o z a ’s treatment.

But

To attain

freedom it is first necessary to recognize the b o n d 
age of man, the fixed determination of the emotions
I

through natural laws.

But just as knowledge is

power in regard to external nature, so we can free
ourselves from the emotions by understanding their
laws.
The mind is, after all, something'more
than a series of passive states.

Its essence con

sists in an effort to preserve its own being and
promote its own good*

In carrying out this pur

pose it finds that nothing is so serviceable as
knowledge.

Through knowledge It is possible to

free man f r o m the bondage of the emotions.

An

emotion when understood becomes transformed and
ceases to be a state of passivity.

Moreover,

when the conditions of an emotion are understood,
It is possible to arrange and associate the var
ious emotions in such way as to strengthen and
promote the occurence of those that are desirable
and to weaken and repress those which are hurtful.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The highest kind of knowledge for Spinoza is not
scientific reason but intuition, the direct in
sight that all things follow necessarily from the
nature of God and hence f r o m one system.

God and Nature
The logical foundation of his whole
system lies in the validity of all relative p r o 
positions leaving the Absolute as the sole reality
of the universe.

All turns with Spinoza as with

Descartes on getting true and adequate knowledge
of the essences of things.

All essences when

presented to the mind, carry with them a convic
tion of their own truth, and as they cannot con
tradict one another they f o r m a system of truths
deduced f rom one principle as their primary cause*
Such a principle can only be God, f r o m whose qual
ities all the essences of things flow as a matter
of necessity, of in other words are caused, since
Spinoza does not distinguish between logical d e 
pendence and dynamic causation.

In this way his

logic passes over Into his metaphysics and in
attempting to determine the cause of things Spin
oza has to determine the essences of things and
their relation to the Highest Reality.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I

This Highest Reality he calls at the be-

\

ginning of his Ethics either God, or Nature, or

j

Substance*

I

three stages in the development of his thought,

|
i
|

each one finding its characteristic expression in

An attempt has been made to distinguish

each of these words.

The attempt fails not only

because there is not sufficient regularity in us
age but also because the triplicity of standpoint
is fundamental.

It is God who is Nature, and it

is Nature which is Substance; and the different
words appear as the matters dealtwith, change and
change about.

The three primary problems of thought

are those of origin, structure and stuff.

Vi/hen

Spinoza is thinking of the first he would seem to
prefer the word God, when of the second - Nature,
and when the third - Substance.

They are all one

and the same, and are only different f r o m different
points of view.

This is really the argument of the

earlier propositions of the Ethics just as it was
of the Short Treatise.

Substance
I
1

J
5

The Short Treatise took over the conception of Nature and showed that if taken seriously it is one with God.

Nov/ the Ethics takes

f

?

i

I
!
!

I
L.

—

- - -----------
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i
J
16.

over the word Substance, a favorite word in '
current thought, and shows that Substance and God
are one.

The point is simple.

The traditional

phisosophy had spoken of substances as if each one
of them were independent and selfcontained.

Spin

oza insists that such self-contained entities do
not as a fact exist.

All things are bound to

gether inextricably.

Hence, if only that which

can stand by itself is substance, there is only
one substance - the system of the whole universe.
This system as being infinite - self-coherent and
self-complete - is one with the eternal self suf
ficient and self-subsistent being called God.
What was asked from the conception of Substance
is in fact only given by the idea of God and so
Spinoza can say in his 14th proposition:

"Apart

f rom God there is not, nor can there b& conceived
any substance."

(Ethics 1-14-0-

There can be only

one real Substance because a Substance is defined
as self-contained and only the whole of things is
self-contained.

Everything less than the whole

is dependent on something else.

Even Descartes

saw that his two substances were dependent on God
who was the basic substance, and therefore were
not substances in the same sense as God.

But if

substance is really self-dependent, it must be all

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

f

that is*

And if it he all that is, it must be un-

'i

j

limited; for

to be limited is to be limited by

|
\
|
•D
|

something, and hence to depend - at

being has nothing outside of it to limit it and

I

hence is unlimited.

(I

ness.

I

have all possible attributes*

limitations - on something else*

least for its

But the whole of

Spinoza calls this, infinite-

The essence of an infinite substance is to
An attribute is the

. if
j|

essence of a

substance as perceived b y the intel-

|

lect and the

intellect has two such attributes;

|

thought and extension.

j
if
j!

and extended substance as we know him; but since he

Therefore God is a thinking

is infinite, he must be much

more besides.

The

{

f

basis then of the parallelism between mind and body,
ideas and things, is their fundamental identity in
Nature or God.

j

The changes which go on in Nature, then,

|

are manifested now as ideas,

now as things.

j

our minds are a collection of ideas,

As

there must

\

be corresponding to them collections of things or
bodies; and contrariwise, if the object of the idea
I

constituting the human mind be a body, nothing in

|

that body could happen which

would not be per-

j

ceived by the mind.

a matter of fact,

Now, as

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1

the object of the human mind is a hody, to wit, the

j

human body, for all our ideas of the external world

1
j
|
{
I
j
j

are modified by our sense organs
becomes both body and mind.

at least.

Man

Some of our ideas of

our body are obscure,

others are distinct; but

Spinoza in a scholium

(Sth.

II - 10th) to his the

orem proving our dual nature, indicates that there
is a parallelism between certain characters of the
j

body, e.g., its activity, its perceptual acuity,
its independence of other bodies - and of the mindits power of forming many perceptions and distinct

■

concepts.

Unfortunately, he does not elaborate

this point.

i
'

The one substance then is God or Nature

[

with its two attributes of thinking and extension

|
!
[

among the many others.

These two attributes were

in the eyes of Spinoza's contemporaries not only

i.

[

different but "opposite”.

Thus mind was considered

!

to be all that was active, creative, purposeful,
free; and matter all that was passive, inert, mech
anical and determined.

So that Nature seemed to

have contradictory properties.

Could one thing

have these two sets of properties and still be one?
Spinoza in Ethics I, proposition 29 reviews the
I Neo-Platonic conception of natura naturans and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I

natura naturata both fused in one*

It means that

ii

Nature is not created by a power outside itself

|

but, being subject only to its own laws is both

I

creator and created.

1

sive, not in the sense that as an agent it is dif-

I

ferent from acts upon itself as patient, but in

I

the sense that it "just grown" or happens in accor-

1

dance with physical law, and that since physical

|

law prescribed for it by a supernatural power, it -

i

It is both active and pas-

is autonomous, making,

so to speak, its own laws.

|

The distinction implied in the words "agent" and

|

"patient" 'was necessitated not by logic but by
certain scientific presuppositions.

It was pre

supposed, as early as Empidocles, that a change
implied a changer and something to be changed.
If now there was no changer,
be both agent and patient.
t
|

then the changed must
It was another manner

of saying that Nature was sovereign.

And we can

j

I

easily see how easy it was by emphasizing the
materialistic side of Nature, to make Spinoza an
atheist, or by emphasizing the mental side to make
a pantheist.

Attributes and Modes
Spinoza realized the problem that confront
ed him.

He was to connect this Sovereign Nature,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

'

this Being, or Principle which is rigidly one with
the multiplicity of things and persons constituting
the world of imagination.

This he does by positing

intermediate aspects of the One*

God being self-

caused and therefore infinite must have infinite
aspects or attributes*

As previously mentioned,

two only of these are known to man: extension and
thought which sum up the world as humanly known.
These attributes are perfectly parallel one to the
other, all portions of extension or space, having
attached to them, as it were, corresponding ideas
or thoughts,

though these in S p i n o z a ’s curious

psychology are not necessarily conscious and cer
tainly not self-conscious.

But these attributes

being infinite, like their substance, cannot con
stitute finite beings which are due to modifica
tions of these attributes or modes as he calls them.

These modes then are infinite like the
attributes they modify.

Movement, intellect and

will, the physical universe and the intellectual
universe have neither beginning nor end.

Each

one of the infinite modes constitutes an infinite
series of finite modes.

Movement, i.e., infinitely

modified extension, produces the infinitude of
finite modes which we call bodies; intellect and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

will becoming infinitely diversified, produces
particular and finite minds, intellects and wills.
Bodies and minds,

that is, ideas, are neither

relative substances, which would be a contradic
tion in terms,

nor infinite modes, but changing

modes or modifications of the cosmical substance,
or, what amounts to the same, of its attributes.

By distinguishing between infinite modes ■
and finite modes,

Spinoza means to say that motion

is eternal, while the corporeal forms which it con
stitutes originate and decay - that intellects and
wills have existed for eternities, but that each
particular intellect has a limited duration.

Bodies

or limited extensions are to infinite extension,
particular intellects to the infinite intellect,
and the particular wills to the eternal will, what
our thoughts are to our soul.

Just as these exist

only for the soul, like the body exists only for
the substance of which it is a momentary modifica
tion.

Compared with God, souls and bodies are no

more substances than our ideas are beings apart
from ourselves.

In strictly philosophical language,

there is only one substantive; everything else is
but an adjective.

The substance is the absolute,
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eternal, and necessary cause of itself;

[
4

contingent, passing, relative and merely possible*

I

The substance is necessary,

|

cause it exists;

the mode is

j

that is, it exists be-

the mode is contingent and merely

i

possible, that is, it exists because something else
exists and it ma y be conceived as not existing*

The cosmic substance mentioned above is

f
r
|

an extended and thinking thing; it forms both the

*
[

substance of all bodies or matter, and the sub7
stance of all minds.

Matter and mind are two d i f 

ferent ways of conceiving one and the same substance;
two different names for
I

the same thing.

Each of the

attributes of the substance is relatively infinite*

i.

The substance is absolutely infinite in the sense
I
|
I
j

only relatively infinite, that is after its kind,

j

Extension is infinite as such, and thought is in-

i

finite as such; but neither extension nor thought

that there is nothing beyond it: the attribute is

is absolutely infinite, for alongside of extension
there is thought, and alongside of thought there
;

is extension not counting such attributes of sub
stance as are unknown to us.

Substance as such is

the sum of all existing things; extension, though
infinite as extension, does not contain all exis
tences in itself, since there are in addition to
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|
j
j

it, infinite thought and the minds constituted by

|

since there are besides, extension and bodies.

it; nor does thought embrace the totality of beings

!
i
j

Spinoza's God seems to be both an u n q u a l 
ified being,

and an infinitely qualified being*

By

calling God an absolutely undetermined being he does
j
i
|
t

not mean to say that God is an absolutely indeterminate being, or non-being, or negative being, but ■
on the contrary that he has absolutely unlimited
attributes or absolutely infinite perfections, that h e is a positive, concrete, most real being,
the being who unites in himself all possible a t 
tributes and possesses them without limitation.

'
i
;
I
t
!
|

having separate attributes, which would make him

|

a particular being; he is the being who combines

God is therefore no longer conceived as

i

;
|

in himself all possible attributes or the totality

i

of being.

Now each divine attribute constitutes

a world: extension - the material world;
the spiritual world.
i

thought -

Hence-, we must conclude

fr o m the infinite number of divine attributes that
there exists an infinite number of worlds besides
the two known to us - worlds which are neither
material nor spiritual, and have no relation to
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|
i
|

space or time, but depend on other conditions of
existence absolutely inaccessible to the human

(

j

understanding*

|
s
|

field to the imagination, without being absolutely

!

This conception opens an immense

contrary to reason.

However, it must be added

strictly speaking: infinita attributa are bound|

less attributes rather than innumerable attributes.

|
t
!

'Had Spinoza been decided on the question as to
whether the absolute has attributes other than ex
tension and thought he would evidently not have
employed an ambiguous expression.
3 fact his substance

(Vidi Ep.,63)

has extension and thought

only, but it has them in infinite degree.
Spinoza's God is not an object outside
the world, which together with the world makes up
the universe.

He is himself the universe within

which the distinctions and differences constituting
the world obtain.

And if so, he is among other

things inevitably and irrevocably extended.

It is easy to inveigh against a doctrine
which identifies God with the universe and which
sees in the essential characters of the one, essen
tial characters of the other.

Yet it must be r e 

peated that the universe, according to Spinoza's
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conception of it is for more than the physical
world.

His God is the fulness of being, the sup

reme reality.

Such characters,

therefore, as con

stitute the Real as we know it must constitute,
at least in part, the essential nature of God.
Spinoza is trying to give content to the word God
and whatever one m a y think of the result it is
.indubitable that f e w have made the attempt in so
forceful and noble a fashion.
.

i

God then conprises all things, and that
of the free necessity of his own nature, not as
the result of any passing whim or caprice,

yet

He is not their mere framework, a passive contain:

er or conserver.

He is their active source.

"It

t

!
'

is as impossible for us to conceive of God as not
existing as to conceive of him as not acting."
(Eth.II - 3 sch. ) "There are bound to follow f r o m

I
j

the necessity of the divine nature an infinity of
things in an infinity of ways - - - and since all
things are in him, there can be nothing outside

1

him b y which he is determined or compelled to ac-

|

tion, and therefore he acts f r o m the laws of his
own nature only and is compelled by no one.
it follows firstly,

Hence

that there is no cause which

can excite God to action, either extrineiially

I
i
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I

or intrinsically except the perfection of his own

1

nature; and secondly, that God alone exists from

M

the necessity alone of his own n a t u r e . ” (Sth.I -16)
The whole scheme of Spinoza Ethics may possibly be
indicated in the accompanying diagram as found in
the Jewish Encyclopedia.

Vol. XI. p. 515.

i
I

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

SUBSTANCE

rl

Motion
and refet

Infinite
Intellect

C Immediate
MODES

DDES
Mediate
Material
Universe".

INDIVID

Infinite
idea of God

INGS

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Now we pass to the last part of this
paper:

S p i noza’s Ontological Proof of the E xis

tence of God*

In its main outlines Spinoza inher

ited the ontological proof of the existence of God
f rom the middle ages.

St. Anselm (1033 - 1109)

was the first one to announce this proof.

He is

a typical scholastic doctor and a fine exponent
of the alliance between reason and faith which
form the characteristic traits of mediaeval p hil
osophy.

He assumes a priori that revelation and

reason are in perfect accord.

These two manifes

tations of the one and supreme intelligence cannot
possibly contradict each other.

Anselm lived in

an age -when practically every one believed in a
]
f

God from revelation.

Hence we find that he did

i

\

I

|

not consider himself under any obligation to prove
what Descartes thought was a necessary point in

t.

connection with the ontological proof;
i
|

that is,

whether all men are possessed of an idea of supreme
being.

Anselm draws the elements of his argument

f rom St. Augustine and Platonism.

He sets out from

an idea of perfect being, from which he infers the
existence of such a being.

It is a platonic d o c 

trine to say that God does not get his perfections
f ro m without;

he has not received them and we can-
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not say that he has them; he Is and must be all
that these perfections imply; his attributes are
identical with his essence.

Goodness, an attribute

of God, and God, are not two separate things.

This

is a necessary preliminary to the ontological proof
of the existence of God, as understood both by
St. Augustine and Spinoza.
The ontological proof of the existence of
God must be considered an important one,

It has

appealed to so many great thinkers that one simply
cannot dismiss it without a hearing.

No less a

g&nius than Albertus Magnus, Peter of farentais,
Henry of Ghent, Guanillo,

St. Thomas, Richard of

Middleton and Sant find it necessary to refute it;
while on the other hand an equally long list of
great thinkers have accepted it in the main, e.g.,
William of Auxerre, Richard Fishaere, Alexander of
I
|

Hales, John Peckham, Bonaventure, Giles of Rome,

1

John Duns Scotus, William Ware, Descartes and Hegel.

The argument can be stated in a variety
of ways:

first, you cannot have an idea of a per

fect being unless that being exists.

Second,

the

being of which you have the idea is not a perfect
being unless it exists.

Third, if you imagine the

with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1
■1

case of a perfect being that does not e x i s t , then

I

that being would not be perfect unless it exists

|

and if it did not ttxist then you could not have an

|

idea of it.

1

Fourth, perhaps the best statement of

1

the question is the one that indicates its vaiid-

I

ity as being as resting on the principle of contra-

ji

diction:

|

thing or you have not.

j

an idea of a perfect being you are also conceding

\

you either have the idea of a perfect
If you admit that you have

that you cannot think of a perfect being that has
I
not real existence, otherwise you would be thinking
!

or having an idea of an imperfect being,

since a

1

being that possesses all perfections and has real
existence is more perfect than such a being that
has only possible existence.

St. Anselm would say

that I am forced to assent to the reality of a
perfect being just as in every judgement I assent
to a real order of things to which I infer m y judge
ment applies.

I am continually jumping f r o m the

logical to the real order.

I am continually making

outward reference; what right have I to do this in
any instance?

This is one of the most difficult

problems in philosophy.

Philosophers differ as to

why I feel compelled in one instance and not in
another.

St. Anselm holds that when I judge God
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to have real existence this is the one and unique
instance where the very terms in the judgement
carry their own guarantee*

The very nature of the

term "Perfect Being" once it is completely u n d e r 
stood forces the mind to assent to the reality.
If there is a hill there must be a valley;

if there

is an equilateral triangle the angles must be equal
The best statement of this argument is found in the
"Prosolgium Sive Pides Quaerens Intellectum": Certe
id quo cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo
intellectu.

Si enim vel in solo intellectu est

potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Si
ergo id quo majus cogitari potest est in solo in
tellectu, id ipsum quo majus cogitari potest.

Sed

certe hoc esse non potest e x i s t g ^ e r g o procul dubio
aliquod quo majus, cogitari non v*let et in intel
lectu et in re."

St. Guanillo,

St. Thomas and

Kant objected to this argument on the grounds
that if I have

an idea of a golden mountain or a

perfect island neither the mountain nor the
need to exist.

Kant said if I have an idea of a

thousand Talers that does
pocket.

island

not put the money in my

It seems obvious that this objection over

looks' the most important feature of the argument.
The case of a perfect being - God - is unique.
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I
'.'•I

I can think of a Golden Mountain or of a perfect

I

island having a real or possible existence, but

I

I cannot think of an absolutely perfect being as

I

having real or possible existence because a per-

\SJ

1

' feet being that

had only possible

existence would

I

not be perfect* Another

objection that has been

|

brought against this argument is that it is a

iJ

)

.jump from the ideal to the real.

But Anselm would

|

answer what h a r m is there in the jump?

If you

should accuse him of attributing things in your
mind to things outside your mind, he would .say:
"Certainly, that is
trouble lies in

what it is all about*

the word j u m p .

The

It may be illog

ical; where then is there the break in the logic?
|

To say that there is a jump from the ideal to the

I
I

real order, is not a refutation.

i

"

I.

[
\
i
|

When we come to Spinoza we find him
wording the argument in a much more abstruse m a n 
ner but in a way that he himself thought was better.
Spinoza, like Xnselm, places the divine order first,
both in the order of knowledge and in the order of
nature.

Therefore he held that all philosophy

should begin with the nature of God.

But he is

faced with the problem how to arrive at the divine
nature as the first certainty.

In all this Spinoza
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i

j

was following mediaeval traditions.

Spinoza, as

|
j
|

was said previously in this paper, felt the necessity
of putting a mathematical framework into philosophy

]

t

j

and following the method of axioms and definitions.
Like Anselm he wished to arrive at the existence

|
j

of God f rom postulates without placing an a poster-

|

iori element in his argument.

!

he feels that the world can only be understood

Like the scholastic

j

j

t
f
[
|

through and in the nature of God.
as he sums it up himself is:

S p i n o z a ’s method

"Nothing else but

reflective knowledge or the idea of an i d e a . 1' (De
Intellectus Emendatione, c. 7.)
dictum,

Concerning this

Sir Frederick Pollock in his book,

"Spinoza:

His Life and Philosophy" page 126, says,"Now the
|

reflective knowledge which has for its object the
idea of the most perfect being is more excellent
than any other.

I
i

This idea,

then, is the ultimate

object of the mind's pursuit.... Thus the
the most perfect b e i n g 1 includes,

’idea of

if it is not

equivalent to, the belief that the whole nature of
things is one and uniform.

Now this is the very

first principle of all science....In knowing the
'most perfect b e i n g 1 the mind knows itself aspart
of the universal order and at one with it: therein
finding, as we have to learn elsewhere, the secret
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j

of man's happiness and true freedom."

It is here

j

j

that Spinoza parts company with Anselm.

Spinoza

I
i
|

understands by idea first of all a conscious state

|

of the knowing mind, in which the object is repre
sented ‘without explicitly knowing this idea the
mind may know the object*
blending,

{

•

We can see b y this

Spinoza has in view the identification

of the human mind and its object, the universe a
most perfect being, when the idea of the most per
fect being is the object of a reflective act, i.e.
the Idea of an idea.

Plainly this means when we

reflect on the idea of God,, we recognize that the
most perfect being includes both the mind and the
extended universe.

It is doubtful whether this

method is justifiable.

In the first place an en

tirely new meaning is attached to the word "idea".
j
I
j
I
!

Second, the term, idea, it its older sense as having
a representative character is replaced in the argument by the newer meaning without sufficient evi
dence and explanation of its support.

j

V/e must not

be too dogmatic on this point, because after all,
Spinoza was one of the greatest thinkers of all
times, and his way of expressing himself on this
very difficult point may be unfortunate; but it
looks like an example of the fallacy of equivoca-
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tion.

Professor McKeon,

in his book:

"The Phil

osophy of Spinoza", attempts to give logical value
to Spinoza's jump from the ideal to the real order.
The whole matter is extremely difficult but he
deals with it skillfully and profoundly.
are:
ways:

His words

"Logically it can be stated in a variety of
any discourse marks off a realm of discourse

in such wise that any consistent statement indicates
a real and intelligible nature.
orously:

Or stated more r i g 

a postulate may be formulated such that

from it and from the definitions involved it its
statement a proposition may be deduced concerning
the nature of the reality in which such a postu
late is possible;

the truth of that proposition

would follow not from assent to the postulate but
from the very existence of the postulate.
thinking to be possible,

For

it is said in effect,

there must be an infinite perfect being.

But to

formulate such a postulate is an act of thought;
it must, according to its own statement, be referred
to a perfect intelligible being who is implicated
in any statement.

Yet knowledge of his nature will

be independent of the truth or falsity of other
statements;

in fact, although the being of God is

first indicated in these statements, once it is
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I

their truth or falsity will depend on the nature
of God.

Even the primitive postulate is no longer

postulated but is made apodictic by the better at
tested truth of God's existence."

The question of

the existential status of terms in logic has received
a great deal of attention among modern logicians;
Bradley, Bosanquet, Joseph, Keynes and Coffey have
treated it at some length.

They are all very diffi

dent about arguing from consistency in the realm of
logic to objective reality.

In "The Science of

Logic"

"It must be a realm

(I, 53) Coffey says:

which is not only present to, but also indepen
dent of, the individual thinker's actual thought,
and to which an appeal can be made to verify his
judgments about things the2'-ein."
}
|

It would seem that the first requisite

i

of a reality in which any postulate is possible

1

that it be independent of the thinker's actual

is

i

!

thought.

Even as the "idea of an idea" must be

checked by an a posteriori relation.
is absolutely true or not

'.Whether this

the present writer feels

that he is not in a position to pass judgment.
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j

i
!

predicate which refers us to some objective sphere

j
j
j

which is a portion at least of all conceivable

j

However the fact stands that every judgment has

reality.

In this sense every judgment implies the

existence or reality of its ultimate subject.

Whether

it is possible to find a subject or predicate which
has existence beyond its possibility or conceivability, the present writer is unable to say.

!
j
j

And even

:i

though a postulate may be imaginary through and .

!

through, it must refer to some sphere of reality;

j

The realm of imagination may be called merely pos-

j

sibility; but the merely possible must have some

I

existence.

late which indicates the nature of the reality in

\
I
i
|

which such a postulate is possible is merely to ask

j

It may be that to proceed f r o m a postu-

the mind to make or construct that which will fit
the requisites of a preconceived definition;

in the

case of the ,rOntological Proof of the Existence of
God" the Idea of a perfect being w o u l d remain purely
mental or ideal, and so in the realm of logic which
made possible the existence ofthepostulate.

What

Anselm or Spinoza would say to this modern objection
it is impossible to tell and the present writer
feels sure that he has nothing new to add.
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